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An empirical investigation into the corporate culture of UK listed 
banks  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper reports findings from investor engagement into corporate culture at UK listed 
banks.  In 2014 and 2015 interviews with bank practitioners revealed the following six 
elements as fundamental to improving bank culture; simplification of the business, corporate 
purpose, organisational culture, staff in the business, customer experience, and focus and 
engagement by the Chair of the board.  The study designed baselines to capture where 
banks are in absolute and relative terms in relation to the six elements.  Culture performance 
over the 24 months of the study was examined. 
Banks that made most improvement during the investigation activated culture predominantly 
within the business by empowering the department most apt to handle it.  Centring the 
culture programme within the business was associated with a focus on the middle and the 
grassroots level of the organisation.  Banks that made least improvement activated culture 
principally ‘from the top’.  Centring the culture programme at the top was associated with a 
focus on control, conformance, and structure.  The finding of relatively greater performance 
when culture programmes were activated within the business contrasts sharply with 
recommendations from regulators and conventional wisdom that the establishment of 
corporate culture is necessarily a top down exercise.   
Key words: banks, conduct, culture, metrics, measures, investment management, pension 
funds.   
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1: Introduction 
A strong belief to have emerged in recent years has been that culture within banks is both a 
weakness and a potentially systemic risk.  Improved corporate culture is essential to 
restoring public trust in the banking system, encouraging long-term saving, and enhancing 
financial stability (Financial Stability Board, 2014; Financial Reporting Council, 2016; 
Banking Standards Board, 2016; Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2016; and Financial 
Services Consumer Panel; 2016).  
In addition to the broad economic interest story that banks enable economic growth, the 
centrality of the banking industry to all our daily lives makes corporate culture a public 
interest story.  In the last few years banks have paid more than £200 billion in fines and 
damages worldwide as a result of inappropriate conduct (Conduct Costs Project, 2016), 
leading misconduct and culture to rapidly rise up the hierarchy of key financial risks when 
investing in banks.  With fines and redress since the financial crisis covering a growing 
proportion of the banking industry, strong views are being expressed that bank corporate 
culture needs to be urgently addressed (City Values Forum, 2016; Banking Standards 
Board, 2016).   
Regulation may provide part of the answer, but while regulators can regulate structure, they 
cannot directly regulate culture, values, attitudes, or behaviour.  It’s up to others, including 
investors, to also exert pressure on banks to make improvements.  Around the world, 
corporate governance codes often mention culture, values, and conduct in their guidance.  
Investors incorporate these good practice steers and recommendations through their 
stewardship.  The UK Stewardship Code encourages large investors to engage with 
companies to discuss corporate governance issues, with the ultimate aim of improving long-
term risk-adjusted returns for their clients.  Voting at general meetings and engaging with 
companies are the key transmissions of investment stewardship. 
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This study concerns the meetings one large, long-term investor held with officers and 
directors of UK banks to discuss their culture programmes during 2014 and 2015.  Meeting 
with officers and directors of banks was considered the right approach because the 
decisions banks are making on culture and culture programmes are largely obscured from 
public view.  Major shareholders are fortunate in the UK to have good access to company 
boards and can fill information gaps through private conversations1. 
The investor in this study is a pension fund, among the largest in the country by 
membership, with more than four million members.  The pension fund invests in equities 
mostly via a diversified equity index, meaning it invests in all the large listed banks. The 
pension fund will continue to hold each bank all the time each remains in the index.  This 
continuous holding period creates a very long term time horizon and motivates the pension 
fund to expend a great deal of effort on engaging and working alongside companies to try to 
improve risk-adjusted returns where doing so is cost effective and accretive financially for 
members.   
Key reasons for meeting with officers and directors was to understand culture performance, 
and to encourage banks to work together to collectively reduce systemic and systematic risk.  
The pension fund recognises that it’s not the only shareholder meeting to discuss culture, 
but its approach of wanting to see the whole industry improve culture performance is 
different.  Positive change was further encouraged by feeding back results in the form of a 
report to the Banking Standards Board as well each bank.   
The UK makes an interesting case study because a few banks make up a substantial part of 
what is a relatively large banking sector.  Since the financial crisis, misconduct through poor 
culture has cost UK banks £26.5 billion (Conduct Costs Project, 2016).   
The study has three main findings. 
                                            
1
 While operating within disclosure restrictions about material information. 
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First, discussion with bank experts in 2014 and 2015 revealed six elements to be 
fundamental to improving bank culture; corporate purpose, organisational culture, staff in the 
business, simplification of the business, customer experience, and focus and engagement 
by the Chair of the board.  A hierarchy was identified, with the first three elements having 
more importance.  The study developed baselines to capture in absolute and relative terms 
where banks were in relation to these six elements.  Explanations were derived for each 
bank’s position in relation to each baseline.   
Second, during the 24 month of the investigation, significantly greater culture performance 
was found in banks that activated culture from within the business.  Centring the culture 
programme within the business was associated with a focus on the middle and the 
grassroots level of the organisation.  Least culture performance came from banks that 
activated culture programmes top-down.  Centring the culture programme at the top was 
associated with a focus on control, conformance, and structure.  The finding of relatively 
greater culture performance when activated within the business is in strong contrast to the 
recommendation of the UK’s financial reporting regulator and conventional wisdom that a 
key role for corporate boards is to establish culture (FRC, 2014).    
Third, the study found culture to be a highly metricised area.  There were contradictions and 
ambiguities with many of the metrics, and this posed difficulties about which to give attention 
to, and how.  Few were unambiguously decision useful.  Banks making the largest 
improvements in culture were those grappling most with, and solving, the ambiguities with 
metrics.  Results suggest that the integration of decision useful metrics and their 
understandings are at an early stage (Thakor, 2016). 
The study makes the following original contributions to knowledge in the subject area: 
First, the paper reports new and recent research into how small groups of people – officers, 
directors, and managers – are designing and delivering culture programmes at UK listed 
banks, as well as the culture performance achieved.  The project, spanning two whole years 
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between 2014 and 2015, represents a rare insight into an industry–wide attempt to improve 
motives, action, and outcomes of bank culture.  Culture is intangible, and as such often 
overlooked (Thakor, 2016), and this research contributes to that gap in knowledge through 
insight and evidence based on direct empirical analysis. 
Second, and contrary to conventional wisdom, how and where culture programmes are 
activated is far more critical to performance than the structure that surrounds it.  Structure 
and standards can help improve culture, but are not nearly enough because culture is about 
people in the workplace, their actions, and interactions.  People together constitute 
organisational culture.  Culture is interpersonal, and embedded by people doing banking 
day-by-day, which comes from a myriad of close-knit interrelationships and interactions 
within the organisation.  The shift that regulators desire was far more observable in banks 
that activated culture programmes at the middle and grassroots level of the organisation, 
where interactions, intent and action occur.   
Third, our results rank banks differently than published corporate governance and 
sustainability ranking from third party service providers, suggesting a focus on culture 
performance contributes a different perspective to that based on more available public 
information for corporate governance (Manifest, 2016).  
The next section of the paper reviews the literature.  Section 3 discusses the sample and 
data collection.  Section four reports the findings, and the final section concludes. 
 
2: Literature 
Organisational culture within companies is generally conceptualised as an evolutionary 
process (Lazear (1995).  Culture has been identified as a system of attitudes, customs, 
norms, traditions, beliefs, convictions, and shared values that define behaviour for 
organisational members (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996; Sørensen, 2002).  Hofstede (1991) 
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emphasises that the dimensions of culture are mostly unobservable for they include 
understandings, meanings, interpretations, feelings, and perceptions.  This stands culture 
apart from other research areas such as compensation or capital structure, about which far 
more is known (Thakor, 2016).  Bouwman (2013) provides an extensive discussion of the 
organisational culture literature. 
One of the key interests of culture within banks is the ability of culture proxies to serve as 
potential forward-looking indicators of reputation, trustworthiness, and business performance 
(Dukerich and Carter, 1998; Alsop, 2004; Thakor, 2016).  Kreps (1990) hypothesises that a 
uniform and strong culture is a coordinating mechanism in an organisation, with the 
mechanism helping to achieve more predictable outcomes via wider social networks, 
interactions, and cooperation between employees.  Also achieved is a more consistent 
organisational approach to unforeseen contingencies.  Multiple cultures or a weak culture 
can create diminished ability to predict outcomes for any given set of actions by 
individuals and firms.   
Van den Steen (2010a) argues that corporate culture has a homogenising effect on 
individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, convictions, and ambitions.  In its absence, heterogeneous 
attitudes and beliefs lead to diverging views about appropriate action and behaviour. 
In addition to more predictable outcomes, more than three decades of research show that 
the culture of an organisation has a lasting impact on business performance  (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982; Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992; Kotter and Heskett, 1992). Sackmann (2011) 
identifies 55 papers published since 2000 that study culture and performance and finds that 
most support a positive relationship between corporate culture and firm performance. 
The largely unobservable nature of culture yet positive attributes make the study of culture 
within banks particularly significant.  
 
7 
 
3: Research Methods 
The aim of the research was to build a picture from the ground-up.  The grounded approach 
is an empirical method that allows a researcher to adopt a broad view on a subject that is not 
well understood and to derive theory based upon observation (Barker, 1998).  Grounded 
methods do not detail data collection techniques. Rather, they provide analytical procedures 
that help the investigator organise and reduce the already collected data to manageable 
proportions and to ground out frameworks through development, refinement and 
interrelations (Charmaz, 2000, p510). It’s up to researchers to collect good data and provide 
confidence that reliable sample selection and data collection methods have been undertaken 
(Charmaz, 2000; Glaser, 1992).  
 
3.1: Sample and data 
The investigative population was small, medium, and large UK listed banks.  This list is quite 
short as British banking is highly consolidated. We met all the banks, including Barclays, 
HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, and Standard Chartered, but also broadened out the 
meetings to include organisations in the unlisted banking sector as well as member 
associations.  The pension fund does not have holdings in credit unions or building societies 
but a wider inquiry among a broader set of key stakeholders was thought appropriate to help 
better understand the listed banking sector.  These extra meetings included, but were not 
limited to, the Building Societies Association, Association of Financial Mutuals, Nationwide, 
Community Development Finance Association, and British Bankers’ Association.  The 
pension fund also participated in policy debates at a regulatory and government level where 
additional information was gained. 
During 2014 and 2015 the pension fund met with managers, senior executives and members 
of the board of directors at each of the major UK listed banks.  Responsibility for culture 
programmes can originate in one of several areas within a bank, and it often took a couple of 
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meetings to connect with the right people.  The pension fund met each bank up to five times.  
Altogether, 30 meetings were held over the 2 years.  The final sample of 30 compares 
favourably with other studies based on interviews in the financial services sector, including 
the 16 of Barker (1998), 11 of Hendry et al (2006), and 27 of Holland and Doran (1998). 
 
3.2: Method 
The data collection method involved face-to-face semi-structured meeting interviews.  Semi-
structured interviews have the advantage of being able to explore open-end and wide-
ranging questions on pre-determined issues (Barker, 1998).  A small number of semi-
structured interview questions were constructed.  Some changes to the questions were 
made during the first two interviews.  Each new interview embodied the revisions suggested 
from the previous.  By the third meeting no further amendments were made to the broad 
question areas.  Parker and Roffey (1997) suggest that the emergence of an appropriate 
question set is especially appropriate for dimensions of accounting and finance where there 
is relatively little existing literature.  The first round of interviews with bank experts 
established the six core elements around which baselines were designed. 
A hard copy letter or email addressed to the company secretary was used to request a 
meeting.  At non-executive level we met the chairperson, remuneration committee chair, and 
directors responsible for risk, internal control, ethics and conduct.  At executive level we met 
the company secretary, investor relations director, director of human resources, and director 
of change and culture.  We also met various managers and advisers.  The different locations 
of responsibility for culture programmes were also found by Montagnon (2016) in relation to 
business ethics and sustainability. 
 
3.3: Meetings 
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Most meetings were held at the banks.  The same two representatives of the pension fund 
were common to all interviews.  Detailed notes were taken based on a pre-agreed template.  
Notes of the pension fund representatives attending each meeting were cross-checked, and 
some areas scored.  Early on in the interviews we tested for inter-rater reliability between the 
two pension fund meeting representatives (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  They are of different 
gender and nationality but had experience of working together.  Their scores had good 
correspondence and a high reliability score, or Cronbach’s Alpha.  The broad questions we 
covered at the meetings were grouped according to the following areas: 
• Sense – of where bank staff believed the bank was in relation the culture baselines, 
sense of the culture performance expected over the next 24 months, sense of the 
strength and weaknesses of elements of the culture programme. 
• Strategy – broad questions asked included where was the culture programme originated, 
how it was arrived at, was it informed by external advisers or developed inhouse, what 
made the strategy right for the company, how was the strategy activated, where, and 
why? 
• Scope – broad questions asked from a culture perspective included what business the 
bank has chosen not to do, what business the bank has chosen to do, the approach to 
growth and retrenchment of the business, and what are going to be the future entry and 
exit decisions from lines of business, why and when?  
• Design and delivery – broad questions included who designed the culture programme, 
why is the programme designed the way it is, how’s the programme delivered, how do 
staff at different levels across the company contribute to the programme, how do their 
results feed back and lead to further change? 
• Governance process – broad questions asked included where in the business was the 
governance of culture owned, whether the process was top-down, bottom-up, and how 
does the information and learning flow?  
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• Metrics - what metrics and measures are used to identify the outcomes of the 
programme? 
Meeting notes were written onto a template, which helped to: 
• Identify common themes and differences. 
• Develop a baseline from which we can measure culture change over time. 
• Gather examples of what was working well and what was not. 
• Understand what excellent, medium, and poor looks like.   
• Collect metrics and measures. 
 
3.4: Data Analysis 
Following Hendry et al (2006), attention was paid both to the content and the contexts of the 
interviews.  We looked for repetitions, themes and cross-interview commonalities. These 
indicate theoretical saturation in areas, and give confidence that emerging frameworks are 
grounded in the data and capture underlying processes rather than individual company 
policies. A five step analytical process was used that followed Charmaz (2000). This 
involved coding and cataloguing, comparative methods, memo writing to construct 
conceptual analyses, sampling to refine emerging theoretical ideas and links, and integration 
of the data into the constructed framework.  
 
4: Results 
In 2014 and 2015 bank experts highlighted the following six elements as key to improving 
bank culture: 
1. Simplification of the business 
2. Corporate purpose 
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3. Organisational culture 
4. Focus and engagement by the Chair of the board 
5. Staff in the business 
6. Customer experience 
Baselines measured where banks are in relation to these six elements.  Each of these is 
now discussed in more detail. 
4.1: Simplification of the business 
The general consensus was that over the past two decades banks have pursued an 
acquisitive and growth orientated culture.  Businesses became calibrated around expansion, 
and stretched across markets, jurisdictions and products.  Regional businesses were 
sometimes run as autonomous fiefdoms.  Boards had no metrics or measures to inform how 
quality was changing as each business stretched.  When retrenchment or exit occurred, little 
regard was paid to the effect may have this had on customers and businesses resident in 
the region or market, for example exit causing a vacuum of local credit availability that high 
interest money lenders could now serve.   
Banks also expanded across products.  Several medium size banks were run entirely on a 
product basis, with products designed to cover as much of the waterfront of potential 
customer interest.  Some retail banks had up to 250 different financial products.  Customer 
relationships that spanned multiple products within different divisions in a bank were often 
not picked-up, leading to an often inconsistent experience from the customer perspective.  
The primary unit of measurement was the product and its volume, rather than the customer.  
Retail banks lost their understanding of where the money is made and who they serve.   
All the banks were currently simplifying their business by exiting markets, jurisdictions, and 
products.  Doing so made the business more manageable and governable financially and 
culturally.  Van den Steen (2010b) predicts that expansion and acquisition can cause 
culture difficulties as two internally homogeneous groups with beliefs and preferences 
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that differ come together. The probability that employees in the merged firm will share 
beliefs is lower than what it was in each firm before the merger, leading to cultural 
challenges for internationally acquisitive banks.  This may help partly explain the focus on 
simplifying businesses as fines for misconduct have grown.  In this study simplification 
involved boards asking:  
• 'Is this a market or jurisdiction we want to be in?'  
• ‘Is this a product or financial instrument we want to deliver or transact in?’  
As simplification was virtually guaranteed, boards we spoke to frequently used simplification 
as a concrete example of culture performance.  Narrowing product lines, markets, and 
jurisdictions was a highly transactional activity and banks seemed to find these types of 
decisions relatively straightforward.  The real motive for simplification may have been 
financial rather than cultural, for example as a result of high capital requirements on riskier 
lines of business, or exiting high litigation risk areas to remove the riskier parts of the 
business.  
A significant minority of bank experts mentioned that the intent behind simplification was 
often the difference between good culture and poor culture.  Good simplification culture 
followed a holistic analysis of impacts on stakeholders.  If the overall impact on stakeholders 
was negative, despite the commercial merits of simplification, it did not proceed.  Two banks 
had decided not to exit from lines of business even though commercial measures suggested 
the line of business should be exited.  Poor simplification culture was decided on commercial 
grounds only. 
Some experts we met believed that simplification should not be linked to culture 
performance because the simplification taking place has nothing to do with the long-term 
evolution of organisational culture. Banks were simply ‘right-sizing’ their business to the 
prevailing economic-regulatory situation and conveniently citing this as culture.  Sceptics 
believed today’s simplification to be the appropriate profit maximising response to prior over 
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expansion and would have happened regardless of external pressure to improve conduct 
and culture. 
The baseline average for simplification we evidenced was a narrowing of product lines, 
markets and jurisdictions, plus a re-orientation around the customer as the appropriate unit 
of measurement instead of the product and volume.  Upper quartile culture performance 
revealed a more holistic analysis behind simplification decisions.  Even when commercial 
measures suggested a line of business should be exited, this sometimes meant not doing so 
if consumer or stakeholder detriment resulted.  Lower quartile culture performance banks 
focused simplification only on commercial grounds.  Banks located in the bottom quartile had 
little vision about how else to improve culture performance, and simplification served as a 
common denominator.   
 
4.2: Corporate purpose 
Bank experts referred to the term corporate purpose to mean a concise articulation of a 
corporation’s reason for existing.  One viewpoint stressed during the course of the research 
by a significant minority of experts was that corporate purpose provides a compass bearing 
for culture.  Over time, corporate purpose at listed banks has become blurred and no longer 
provides direction for culture.  The experts who held this view stressed that culture is an 
outcome, with one of the inputs being corporate purpose, which must first be addressed. 
The viewpoint continued that traditionally the corporate purpose of banks was easily 
explained and understood.  However, in recent years some banks took the traditional bank 
model of making an economic return from the spread between loan rates and deposit rates 
and leveraged it using the wholesale markets to borrow more so they could lend more.  By 
taking more risk, the quantum of interest income and size of profit grew.  Other banks 
diversified their business, establishing new lines of non-interest revenue based around fee 
income, trading income, and venture income.  As non-interest income came to dominate, the 
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traditional banking function was deemphasised.  Taking risk became the common thread 
running through both the leveraged and diversified banking corporation, but corporate 
purpose was not refreshed in line with a more extensive leverage and non-interest income 
based business.    Culture started to slowly calibrate around risk, and a highly financialised 
culture gradually developed involving more risk for more reward.  The viewpoint concluded 
that unless corporate purpose is sufficiently clear to all who work in a bank, culture has no 
direction other than risk taking.  Listed banks need to return to clarity of corporate purpose to 
achieve improved culture. 
A stronger viewpoint was that if a blurring of purpose has been the result of competition 
among banks, regulators may wish to consider why the forces of competition work 
differently, and at times counter productively, within the banking sector compared to other 
sectors, where competition seems not to create divisive culture. 
There is an interesting read across to our experience when engaging with companies 
outside of the banking sector.  Very often a one-to-one meeting will start with a one or two 
slide introduction on the company’s core purpose, what customer problem are they in 
business to try to solve, the product or service they provide.  For example, large 
pharmaceutical companies talk about their purpose being to provide essential medicines.  
They would often also discuss their social responsibility of ensuring access to medicines.  
Not one engagement in this research started with a listed bank mentioning corporate 
purpose.   
There was further confirming evidence of the experts’ strong viewpoint on corporate 
purpose.  When asked what the bank’s purpose was, different people at the same bank 
would often give quite different responses.  Oftentimes, taking risk, serving customers, 
returns for shareholders, and profit were mentioned, but these are outcomes of a purpose, 
not a purpose per se.  We asked for a single short-word sentence of corporate purpose.  
Many board directors were unable to provide similar responses. 
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Might evidence that banks struggle to articulate one corporate purpose, while large, 
multinational companies in other sectors do not, provide some support to the strong views 
some experts had about the need for a clear corporate purpose in the listed banking sector? 
The baseline evidenced was a low ability to define corporate purpose.  Staff at upper quartile 
banks were more consistent in their definitions about corporate purpose and there was some 
similarity of word use within definitions.  We did not statistically test for the consistency of 
word use.  At lower quartile banks, officers, directors and managers gave wide ranging of 
definitions, most of which were action related such as taking risk, making returns for 
shareholders, and generating profit.  There was very low consistency of word use. 
 
4.3: Organisational culture 
Culture programmes were new to banks.  There was general agreement that with long-term 
commitment organisational culture was amenable to change.  Culture programmes often 
involved modifying the structure of organisational responsibilities, with a new non-executive 
board role on culture, an expanded role for the Group Chief Risk Officer, higher compliance 
headcount, specific roles within human resources, and a culture role for internal audit.  Other 
structures included balanced scorecard remuneration and a reduction or removal of volume 
based remuneration.   
One viewpoint stressed by many experts was that structure alone is not enough.  Culture is 
embedded by people doing banking day-by-day, which comes from a myriad of inter-
relationships and interactions at a grassroots level, which themselves are often based on 
deeply-held assumptions, values and learned patterns of behaviour.  The viewpoint 
continued that to get to the heart of culture and provide the shift that banks and regulators 
desire, much more effort needs to be expended at the middle and grassroots level of banks 
where inter-relationships, interactions, intent and action occur. 
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Culture is mentioned in the preface to the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2014).  
The preface mentions that a task for the board is to set the ‘tone from top’ by establishing 
the culture, values and ethics of the company. This leads to an understandable propensity 
for boards to ‘own’ culture, but this study finds that when culture programmes were 
originated and activated at board level, culture underperformed compared to when it was 
activated from within the business.  One explanation for this result is that the board is 
located at arms-length, and charged with looking beyond day-to-day issues, while culture is 
interpersonal and day-to-day.  The success stories we encountered featured departments, in 
particular the human resources department, acting free from the formality of the board.  
Culture change was more innovative and dynamic when originated and activated from within 
the business.  While responsibility for culture may ultimately have to be owned by the board, 
culture performance improved when boards were less involved in design and activation.  Our 
findings suggest that the vital role for the Chair and the whole board is focus, engagement, 
and trained questions about the culture programme designed and delivered by the 
department most apt to handle it.  A board can set mission, values, and purpose, but there is 
a danger of reductionism to believe a board can simply set culture from the top.   
The people we discussed culture with at banks were mostly late career white British men 
and women of relatively senior working age.  On first impression there was almost no 
diversity other than gender, but as the meetings evolved significant diversity of thought and 
an interesting collage of views became apparent.  It was striking to see so few young or non-
Anglo Saxon origin professionals appointed to run culture programmes within banks.  Among 
late-career leaders of culture we encountered thoughtfulness, deliberation, and mindfulness, 
while among mid-career and younger professionals we encountered high energy, 
enthusiasm, and greater implementation orientated culture programmes.    More culture 
performance was observed in banks that had not followed the normal route of identifying a 
skill gap, appointing a late-career senior leader to develop, perhaps with external board 
adviser input, and having the board direct the programme.   
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One, uniform, organisational culture was the ideal goal, but views differed about the 
achievement of this goal.  Some bank experts believed a single culture was achievable, but 
in the absence of an enduring culture programme, larger and more multi divisional banks 
were thought likely to develop subcultures.  Experts within large, international and complex 
banks put a low likelihood of achieving one, uniform, culture, but most still thought that the 
best course of action for a culture programme was to continue as if one organisational 
culture was achievable.  Second best did not mean simply accepting different divisional 
cultures.  One large, international, multidivisional bank thought one culture was neither 
achievable nor worth pursuing.  The board had concluded to accept multiple cultures and to 
contain culture disparity through implementing an internal control environment that included 
conformance controls for managers and staff.  The conformance effort mostly involved a 
cascade of communication from the top and interactive modules for management and staff 
to read, complete, and implement.     
In recent years UK boards have come under pressure to use consultants less but on culture 
there was significant use of external advisers.  Banks unable to find inhouse solutions to 
culture problems took greater input from advisers.  A small minority of banks arranged for us 
to meet their advisers, and it became clear that the ideas and opinions of a very narrow pool 
of advisers circulate the boardroom of several major banks.  In the last few years one 
individual adviser alone had shaped culture at three major UK listed banks, plus other large 
overseas listed banks with a substantial UK presence. It was difficult to see how this 
concentration of influence from such a narrow pool of people within very large banks in the 
UK could benefit the sector.   
The organisational culture baseline took into account where in the business the culture 
programme was originated, activated, its breadth, embeddedness within the business, and 
pipeline of future culture work.  The baseline average was a large focus on top-down 
structure that involved greater use of internal audit, Chief Risk Officer, and a control 
environment.  Baseline banks took input from external advisers.  Control metrics included 
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the proportion of staff attending seminars and teach-ins, completion of on-line modules, and 
the proportion of total remuneration based on ethics and integrity.  There was a limited 
pipeline of future culture work and little long-term commitment.  Upper quartile banks made 
little or no use of advisers and there was far more focus within the business at the middle 
and grassroots level.  There was a strong pipeline of future culture work.  There were 
attempts to directly measure cultural shifts in the understandings, meanings, beliefs, and 
interpretations of staff.  Lower quartile banks were overwhelmed about where to begin work 
on culture, and focused on the more tangible area of conduct rather than culture itself.   
 
4.4: Focus and engagement by the Chair of the board 
All the Chairpersons we met fully supported the creation of the UK Banking Standards 
Board, an independently led body that promotes high standards, including culture, across 
the UK banking industry.  
Typical meetings with Chairpersons less engaged on culture revealed little about intent, 
motivation, choice, decision, and action.  One didn’t gain much of a grasp about culture 
performance.  Conversations usually involved listening to the Chair talk about the control 
environment established by the board. 
So much more insightful was dialogue with Chairpersons fully engaged on culture.  
Conversations would flow from which group of people are motivating other people, and 
where attention is paid and not paid, through what actions are being fostered and inculcated 
throughout the bank, to how outcomes of a particular programme of work are being 
measured.   
The baseline average we encountered for the focus and engagement by the Chair of the 
board was a dispassionate conversation about structure.  The conversation tended to focus 
on simplification, markets, and customer metrics as indicators of culture performance.  At 
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upper quartile banks the Chair of the board spoke unprompted with knowledge, acumen, and 
passion about culture performance, its delivery and performance, and spoke with equal ease 
about top down structure and behaviour within the business.  There was greater focus on 
staff as the fulcrum of organisational culture.  At lower quartile banks the Chair of the board 
was not available.  Culture appeared to be of little focus for the bank. 
 
4.5: Staff in the business 
Staff are the heart of culture, as well as key touch points for customer experience.  The 
banks we met wanted staff to have greater competence, professionalism, integrity, diversity 
of thought, and ability to break through existing ways of doing.  Patel’s (2014) interviews with 
professional bodies reports similar results.  One part of delivering on that intent was to 
recruit people who’d taken and passed appropriate exams, who were members of a relevant 
professional body, and who had different skill sets.  Some banks were purposefully hiring 
from outside the financial services sector to bring in new types of people and personality, 
particularly within areas such as human resources, change management, and business 
development.  Those who’d joined culture programmes from outside the sector had many 
ideas they were hoping to take forward.  The other part of delivering on the intent was to 
raise competency among current staff and signal that aiming higher is part of what 
professionalism and performing effectively now means.   
Professionalization involved continuing workshops, seminars, training programmes, 
refresher courses, and exams.  Staff metrics tracked recruitment and professionalization.  
Metrics included the number of refresher courses carried out, training programmes 
completed, memberships of professional organisations, exams taken and passed, and an 
overall average for the professionalization of staff. 
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Staff were also being encouraged to speak-up about moral and ethical issues, the work 
environment, colleagues, grudges, likes, and dislikes.  Personal conduct and whistleblowing 
cases were on the rise.   
Several board members were uneasy, nervous even, about whether a step too far had been 
taken towards honesty, and an open environment within banks.  The problem for the 
directors was not with making a virtue out of honesty, rather it was the potential distraction to 
the business and amount of board time taken from making honesty such a large focus.  This 
was one of the paradoxes of a more open culture.   
Many staff metrics were difficult to evaluate.  The number of whistleblowing calls per 1,000 
staff is a typical metric.  The difficulty posed concerns whether a falling number of 
whistleblowing calls is good - as this could indicate improving conduct, or bad - as this could 
indicate a culture in which staff no longer feel able to speak-up?  All banks were pondering 
the ambiguity apparent in this metric.  A research problem for banks was that these 
contradictions were present in many of the metrics in use.  The puzzles posed by some 
metrics highlights gaps in current knowledge.  Service metrics were generally viewed as a 
less ambiguous type of measure and their use in management information was growing. 
Another research problem for banks was that people together constitute culture, but there 
few ideas on how to directly measure this.  A small minority of banks were attempting to do 
so, for example adoption of a common meanings, attitudes, or similarity in interpretation of 
language.  Banks more focused at the grassroots level of culture were at a more advanced 
level in the development of a desired overall measure of organisational culture.  Most banks 
had taken the individual employee as the unit of analysis, and were measuring, for example 
the number of exams taken.   
With the move towards remote working patterns, the fast pace of technological change, new 
communication media, and secure electronic opportunities and threats, some experts 
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believed that new technology, through changing the way staff do banking, is making culture 
more complex to manage and embed, as well as less static than it once was.   
The baseline average evidenced was a focus on individual employees as the unit of 
analysis, from recruitment and professionalism, through whistleblowing and personal 
conduct cases, to values alignment tests and employee engagement surveys.  The 
employee unit of analysis was highly metricised.  Baseline banks were struggling how to 
begin to measure staff in the round and organisational culture alignment.  Upper quartile 
banks were more advanced with developing metrics to directly measure culture itself through 
meanings, interpretations, language use, and norms.  Lower quartile banks tended to focus 
on staff in terms of risk and spoke predominantly about whistleblowing, personal conduct, 
and complaints.  They were at an earlier stage of introducing an open and honest 
environment.  
 
4.6: Customer experience 
There was general agreement that customer experience was a relatively straightforward way 
to develop an understanding about some aspects of culture performance.  The calibration of 
business around customers was general to all the banks and most had similar programmes 
of work and measurement.  There were many ideas of measuring customer experience and 
outcomes.  The focus on measuring customer experience was most apparent on the retail 
side of banks.   
Corporate and investment banking divisions remained more focused on ‘products’, ‘deals’ 
and ‘transactions’.  There were balanced scorecards that rated individual performance on 
integrity, conduct, and ethics were in use, so aspects of culture influenced remuneration at 
the margins.  A small number of corporate and investment banking divisions were starting to 
focus on what ‘deals’ and ‘transactions’ get done, and how.  This was a very new approach.  
In the few banks starting to do this we observed strong leadership with a belief that this was 
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the appropriate path to take.  It was unclear whether the board of directors would stay the 
journey on the disruptive change this was creating within the investment bank.  
Outside of the corporate and investment banking divisions, not all of the customer 
experience metrics in use had come about because of a focus on culture.  The Treating 
Customers Fairly principles of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) are now a decade old 
and require, for example, customer complaints to be recorded and reported.  Banks had, 
however, gone far further with analysis of complaints than required by the FCA.  The 
regulatory definition of a complaint is something not resolved within 24 hours of a customer 
raising it.  Banks were also measuring what customer issues are resolved within 24 hours, 
and how.  They had developed metrics to track what, when, and how complaints were 
resolved, as well as unresolved complaints.  The highest culture performance banks were 
using content analysis to categorise unresolved complaints in order to identify common 
weakness. Root cause analysis was a technique used by some banks to indicate common 
causes and highlight areas of below average culture performance.  One bank had started 
using content analysis of the electronic transcripts of voice calls to appraise the interaction of 
staff and customers.  Metrics based on qualitative information were more time consuming 
and resource intensive to produce, but less ambiguous and more insightful. 
All banks were using ‘field’ based metrics, including net promoter scores from customer 
surveys as well as feedback from mystery shoppers sent to branches or call centres to 
purchase or inquire about particular product or service offerings.   
The final set of metrics attempted to measure change in the level of customer trust.  A small 
number of banks were trying to do this.  One approach was to employ an external company 
to create a trust index based on a survey of external perceptions.  More personal interaction 
with customers, including face-to-face time, catch-ups and other interactions may lead 
customers to trust banks more. One bank was measuring levels of personal interaction.  Two 
banks were interested in measuring whether customer risk appetite responds to improved 
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levels of trust.  The hypothesis was that improved trust may be evidenced by shifts in 
savings from cash based saving and investment products to risk-based saving and 
investment products.  This followed the concept that low trust customers may be less willing 
to take financial risks with their bank (Cox, 2008).  Customer inertia was expected to stop 
low trust customers switching to another bank.  Experts stressed how important trust was 
because many customers may be under-risking themselves due to low trust.  
The baseline average was one of considerable focus on customer experience. Also at the 
baseline, balanced scorecards within corporate and investment banking divisions brought 
integrity, conduct, and ethics into remuneration at the margins.  The reward system was 
downside focused.  100% remuneration was awarded for personal integrity, conduct, and 
ethics in line with expectations, with less than 100% awarded for lower than expectations.  
No upside was applied for exceeding expectations.  Upper quartile banks were starting to 
change what, and how, deals and transactions are done within corporate and investment 
banking.  Outside of corporate and investment banking, content analysis was being used on 
customer transcripts to understand experiences in greater detail.  Levels of customer trust 
were tracked via customer risk appetite, savings rates, and shifts from cash based saving 
and investment products to riskier saving and investment products.  Lower quartile banks 
had not made inroads into corporate and investment banking.  There was, as yet, no focus 
on root cause analysis, content analysis, or  trust indices.  
 
5: Conclusion and recommendations 
This paper has reported new research into how small groups of people – officers, directors, 
and managers – are guiding the governance, design, and delivery of culture programmes at 
UK listed banks.  The method involved some thirty face-to-face semi-structured meeting 
interviews.  A pre-agreed template was used to score and write detailed notes.  From many 
repetitions, themes and cross-interview commonalities, a rich set of findings evolved. 
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People together constitute the culture.  To get to the heart of culture and provide the shift 
that banks and regulators desire, much more effort needs to be expended at the middle and 
grassroots level where interrelationships, interactions, intent and action occur.  Banks 
focused on the grassroots level had achieved greater culture performance than banks 
focused on structure.  Structure can help improve culture, but is not enough.  We found 
greater emphasis on structure when culture was set from the top, and greater emphasis on 
the middle and grassroots when culture programmes were activated within the business. 
Improving culture requires sustained commitment, but in our meetings we didn’t get the 
sense that culture programmes was baked-in for the long-term.  Board refreshment, change 
in Chief Executive, Chair, or other key person could halt the positive momentum evident.  At 
the end of the study some of these concerns materialised. One bank changed Chief 
Executive.  The board was reportedly in part concerned about the damage on the profitability 
of the investment bank from the culture programme (Guardian, 2015).  Staff working on 
culture in the retail bank were applying for other positions.  When we came to send our 
report to those who contributed many had moved on.  Only sustained effort is likely to 
generate long-term culture performance. The Banking Standards Board or Financial 
Reporting Council could help banks to sustain their effort by encouraging them to publicly set 
out their commitment and the strength of the long-term policy lock to a culture programme.   
Oftentimes when we talk to companies in other sectors we’re told that our approach is 
interesting and helpful, yet banks made no such comment, leaving us to wonder whether 
some banks are too large to listen?  The Banking Standards Board could help to nudge 
banks into listening to outside views by holding a regular stakeholder conference that 
formally puts findings and perspectives of stakeholders to banks. 
We checked our results against corporate governance and sustainability ranking from third 
part service providers by looking at each bank’s corporate governance rank as reported by 
two leading UK corporate governance rating agencies.  Our results rank banks differently 
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(Manifest, 2016), suggesting a focus on culture performance contributes a different 
perspective to that based on more available public information for corporate governance.  
The only overlap was that the bank lowest in rank on key corporate governance indicators 
was also most often lowest quartile in our analysis (Manifest, 2016). Statistically, this result 
could easily be from chance alone. 
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